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We consider the psychological effect of preference reversal and show that it finds a
natural explanation in the frame of quantum decision theory. When people choose
between lotteries with non-negative payoffs, they prefer a more certain lottery because
of uncertainty aversion. But when people evaluate lottery prices, e.g., for selling to others
the right to play them, they do this more rationally, being less subject to behavioral biases.
This difference can be explained by the presence of the attraction factors entering the
expression of quantum probabilities. Only the existence of attraction factors can explain
why, considering two lotteries with close utility factors, a decision maker prefers one
of them when choosing, but evaluates higher the other one when pricing. We derive a
general quantitative criterion for the preference reversal to occur that relates the utilities of
the two lotteries to the attraction factors under choosing vs. pricing and test successfully
its application on experiments by Tversky et al. We also show that the planning paradox
can be treated as a kind of preference reversal.
Keywords: preference reversal, decision theory, uncertainty, behavioral quantum probability, planning paradox
1. Introduction
For many decades, psychologists and economists have been intrigued by a seemingly anomalous
effect termed preference reversal. The simplest example illustrating this effect is as follows. First,
subjects are asked to choose between two lotteries, say L1 and L2, such that L1 has a high chance
to win a relatively modest prize, while L2 offers a lower chance of winning, but an essentially larger
prize. The majority of subjects choose the more certain win of lottery L1, despite the fact that lottery
L2 can enjoy a larger expected utility. Then subjects are asked to price each of the lotteries, as if they
would own them and wish to sell the right to play them. Surprisingly, the majority of subjects price
higher the less certain lottery L2 in apparent contradiction with their previous choice. This example
embodies the essence of the preference reversal effect.
Among the first scientists emphasizing the existence of this effect were Lindman (1971) and
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971, 1973). Their studies were followed by several authors demonstrating
the occurrence of this effect in psychology and economics (Grether and Plott, 1979; Loomes and
Sugden, 1983; Holt, 1986; Goldstein and Einborn, 1987; Karni and Safra, 1987; Segal, 1988; Tversky
et al., 1988; Schkade and Johnson, 1989). Many other citations can be found in the review articles
(Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1983; Tversky and Thaler, 1990; Tversky et al., 1990). The experimental
studies have established the clear validity and robustness of the preference reversal phenomenon.
The preference reversal effect looks surprising because, according to the common understanding
of utility, the choice among the given lotteries should be based on the objective values of the latter,
thus, being procedure invariant. Since the lottery values are not changed, why then is the preference
reversed?
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It has been proved by Tversky and Thaler (1990) and Tversky
et al. (1990) that it is the breaking of procedure invariance that
is responsible for the preference reversal phenomenon. It turns
out that subjects weight more heavily payoffs in pricing than in
choice, so that the preference reversal is a purely psychological
effect.
The origin of the preference reversal has been recently
explained from the point of view of neurology by Kim et al.
(2012). It has been experimentally shown that there exists
correlation between visual fixation and preferences. Visual
fixations both reflect and influence preferences. From one side,
these fixations reflect which objects seem to be more important
for the subject. And, from the other side, such fixations modulate
the neural correlates of preferences, with activity in ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum, reflecting the value of
the fixated item compared to the value of the item not fixated.
Kim et al. studied the process of decision making under risk and
measured eyemovements while people chose between gambles or
bid in pricing gambles. Consistently with the previous work, they
found that, for two gambles matched in expected value, people
systematically chose the higher probability option, but requested
a higher ask price for the option that offered the greater amount
to win, thus demonstrating preference reversal.
This effect was accompanied by a shift in fixation of the
two attributes, with people fixating more on probabilities during
choices and more on amounts during selling. In this way, there
exists probability-vs.-amount dichotomy: When choosing, one
pays more attention to probabilities while, when selling, one
better appreciates amounts.
Understanding the cause of the preference reversal is the first
necessary step. The next step should be the description of this
effect by a mathematical model. Previous suggested models were
not successful, as was analyzed by Tversky and Thaler (1990) and
Tversky et al. (1990). In the present paper, we show that the effect
of preference reversal finds a simple and natural explanation in
the frame of the Quantum Decision Theory developed by the
authors (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008, 2009a,b, 2010, 2011, 2013,
2014a,b, 2015).
2. Basics of Quantum Decision Theory
There exists several approaches applying quantum notions to
psychological sciences, as can be inferred from the books
(Khrennikov, 2010; Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012; Bagarello, 2013;
Haven and Khrennikov, 2013) and the review articles (Yukalov
and Sornette, 2009b; Busemeyer et al., 2014; Sornette, 2014;
Ashtiani and Azgomi, 2015), where numerous citations to the
previous literature can be found. Quantum Decision Theory
(QDT) principally differs from all those approaches in two
aspects. First, QDT is based on a self-consistent mathematical
foundation that is common for both quantum measurement
theory and quantum decision theory. Starting from the von
Neumann (1955) theory of quantum measurements, we have
generalized it to the case of uncertain or inconclusive events,
making it possible to characterize uncertain measurements
and uncertain prospects. Second, the main formulas of QDT
are derived from general principles, giving the possibility of
quantitative predictions, without fitting parameters. This is in
contrast with the usual way of constructing particular models
for describing some concrete experiments, with fitting the model
parameters from empirical data.
We shall not repeat here the mathematical foundation of QDT
that has been thoroughly expounded in our previous papers, but
we will just briefly recall the resulting formulas that are necessary
for describing the preference reversal effect.
Let us consider a composite event, called prospect,
pin = An
⊗
B . (1)
Here An is an operationally testable event, represented in a
Hilbert space by an eigenstate |n〉. While B = {Bα, bα} is an
inconclusive event that is a set of possible events Bα , represented
in a Hilbert space by eigenstates |α〉, and equipped with random
amplitudes bα , so that the inconclusive event is represented by a
state |B〉 =
∑
α bα|α〉.
The prospect operator is Pˆ(pin) = |nB〉〈nB|, such that the
prospect probability is given by the quantum formula
p(pin) = TrρˆPˆ(pin) , (2)
where ρˆ is a strategic state of a decision maker. By construction,
the prospect probability enjoys the properties of a probability
measure:
∑
n
p(pin) = 1 , 0 ≤ p(pin) ≤ 1 . (3)
It is easy to show that the prospect probability takes the form
p(pin) = f (pin)+ q(pin) , (4)
where the first term is called utility factor, characterizing the
utility of the prospect, while the second term is attraction factor
representing behavioral biases.
The intuitive explanation of the above probability expression
(4) is straightforward: The definition of a quantum probability
(2) for a composite event can be separated into a term containing
diagonal matrix elements and a term including off-diagonal
elements. The diagonal elements compose the term f (pin), while
the off-diagonal elements define the term q(pin). The occurrence
of an off-diagonal term is a typical feature of quantum theory,
where this quantity is called interference term or coherence
term. The existence of such an interference term constitutes
the principal difference of the quantum approach from the
classical consideration, where there are no interference terms. It
is the appearance of interference terms that makes the structure
of quantum expressions richer then the related classical ones
and that allows one to explain those psychological phenomena
that, otherwise, are inexplicable in classical decision making.
Sometimes, the quantum approach even yields conclusions that
are impossible in classical decision making, as, for instance,
the possibility to agree on disagree (Khrennikov and Basieva,
2014). Below we show that this interference term, composing
the attraction factor, is essential in explaining the existence of
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the preference reversal effect that cannot be described in classical
decision theory.
The prospect probability satisfies the quantum-classical
correspondence principle.
p(pin) → f (pin) , q(pin) → 0 . (5)
This defines the utility factor as a classical-type probability, with
the standard properties
∑
n
f (pin) = 1 , 0 ≤ f (pin) ≤ 1 . (6)
This is equivalent to the normalization condition
∑
nα
|bα|
2〈nα | ρˆ | nα〉 = 1 ,
imposing a constraint on the random quantities bα .
When considering lotteries, an event An ≡ A(Ln) implies the
choice of a lottery Ln. Then the inconclusive set B characterizes
the decision maker hesitations between uncertain events Bα ,
describing uncertainty with respect to the decision maker
ability and with respect to the lottery formulation (Yukalov
and Sornette, 2014b, 2015). The explicit form of the utility
factor is given by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler information
functional, which in the simple case of uncertainty yields
f (pin) =
U(Ln)∑
n U(Ln)
, (7)
withU(Ln) being the expected utility of a lottery Ln. Note that the
minimization of the information functional results in expression
(7) that might be familiar to psychologists as a Luce (1959) choice
rule using utility as response strength.
The attraction factor reflects the effects of quantum coherence
and interference, and in decision theory it represents the
behavioral biases rendering the prospects more or less attractive
from the subconscious point of view of decision maker. By their
definition, attraction factors lie in the interval
− 1 ≤ q(pin) ≤ 1 (8)
and satisfy the alternation property
∑
n
q(pin) = 0 . (9)
Also, in the case of non-informative priors, the attraction factors
for the considered prospect lattice {pin :n = 1, 2, . . . ,N} obey the
quarter law
1
N
N∑
n=1
|q(pin)| =
1
4
. (10)
This law makes it admissible to estimate the attraction factors by
the values±0.25, thus quantitatively predicting preferences.
The prospect lattice is ordered by the values of prospect
probabilities. A prospect pii is termed preferable to pij if and only
if
p(pii) > p(pij) (pii > pij) .
At the same time, a prospect pii is more useful than pij when
f (pii) > f (pij). A prospect pii is more attractive than pij, when
q(pii) > q(pij). In this way, a prospect can be more useful but less
attractive, as a result being less preferable.
A necessary condition for the existence of a nonzero attraction
factor is that the composite prospect be entangled (Yukalov and
Sornette, 2014a, 2015). Otherwise, there is no need of involving
quantum probabilities.
3. General Criterion of Preference Reversal
Preference reversal may naturally arise in the frame of quantum
decision theory. In this section, we derive the general criterion for
the occurrence of this effect.
Suppose a decision maker considers a lattice of just two
prospects
pin = A(Ln)
⊗
B (n = 1, 2) , (11)
with the intention of choosing between them. Here A(Ln) implies
the action of choosing a lottery Ln. And B is a set incorporating
uncertainties associated with this choice. Let one prefer the
prospect pi1 against pi2, which means that
p(pi1) > p(pi2) (pi1 > pi2) . (12)
Taking into account the alternation property, we have
q(pi1)+ q(pi2) = 0 . (13)
This tells us that the prospect pi1 is preferred to pi2 if and only if
f (pi2)− f (pi1) < 2q(pi1) . (14)
Now, assume that the decision maker plans to price the given
lotteries, e.g., wishing to sell them. The lotteries remain the same
as before. However, uncertainties in selling are of course different
from those when choosing, hence, the uncertain set B′, associated
with selling, is different from the set B including uncertainties
associated with choosing. Now, the decision maker evaluates the
two different prospects
pin = A(Ln)
⊗
B′ (n = 3, 4) , (15)
where L1 = L3 and L2 = L4.
Preference reversal implies that, contrary to the situation with
choosing, now the decision maker evaluates higher the prospect
pi4 compared to pi3, so that
p(pi3) < p(pi4) (pi3 < pi4) . (16)
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In view of the alternation property
q(pi3)+ q(pi4) = 0 , (17)
the preference of pi4 occurs only when
f (pi4)− f (pi3) < 2q(pi3) . (18)
Since the lotteries are the same (L1 = L3 and L2 = L4), their
expected utilities are pairwise equal:U(L1) = U(L3) andU(L2) =
U(L4). Therefore, the utility factors are also pairwise equal
f (pi1) = f (pi3) , f (pi2) = f (pi4) . (19)
Combining the above conditions, we obtain the preference
reversal criterion:
2q(pi3) < f (pi2)− f (pi1) < 2q(pi1) . (20)
Let us stress that in classical decision making, where q(pi1) =
q(pi3) ≡ 0, the inequalities (20) cannot hold, which means
that it is impossible to suggest a self-consistent mathematical
explanation of the preference reversal phenomenon in classical
terms, which is in agreement with discussions by Tversky and
Thaler (1990) and Tversky et al. (1990).
Criterion (20) not only explains the preference reversal
phenomenon, but it also provides a quantitative estimate of how
likely it may happen, as well as a posteriori confirmation of why
it has happened. This is because the attraction factors are not just
some additional arbitrary characteristics, but because their signs
are prescribed by the risk aversion notion, while their values are
constrained by conditions (8) – (10). Thus, due to risk aversion
when facing several choices, the more certain lottery is more
attractive, hence q(pi1) > q(pi2), which, in view of the alternation
property (9), implies that q(pi1) > 0, while q(pi2) < 0. Contrary to
this, when pricing, risk aversion is absent, hencemore attractive is
the lottery that can provide the larger gain, so that q(pi4) > q(pi3),
which, again taking into account the alternation property (9), tells
us that q(pi3) < 0 while q(pi4) > 0. Estimating the absolute values
of the attraction factors by the quantity 0.25, which follows from
the quarter law (10), we have the criterion
−
1
2
< f (pi2)− f (pi1) <
1
2
.
Therefore, if the given lotteries are such that their utility factors
satisfy the above inequalities, we may expect that preference
reversal can occur. And, vice versa, if preference reversal has
happened, then the above inequalities must hold. Below we
demonstrate that criterion (20) really provides a necessary and
sufficient conditions for the preference reversal phenomenon.
4. Confirmation of Preference Reversal
Criterion
To confirm the validity of the preference reversal criterion, let us
test it with empirical data of decision-making experiments. We
shall consider pairs of lotteries with the notation of the previous
section. The prospects, related to the choice between the lotteries
L1 and L2, are denoted as pi1 and pi2, respectively. The prospects,
corresponding to pricing of these lotteries, will be denoted by pi3
and pi4. The expected utility of a lottery L = {xi, p(xi)}, consisting
of payoffs xi, with their weights p(xi), will be calculated by the
formula U(L) =
∑
i xip(xi). And the utility factors are given by
expression (7).
Example 1. Let us start with the example given by Tversky and
Thaler (1990). Consider two lotteries
L1 =
{
4,
8
9
| 0,
1
9
}
, L2 =
{
40,
1
9
| 0,
8
9
}
,
whose payoffs 4 and 40 are given in some monetary units. The
type of units, whether these are Dollars, or Euro, or Francs, is
not of importance, since such units are canceled in definition (7)
of utility factors. This is one of the advantage of employing the
dimensionless utility factors that are invariant with respect to the
type of payoff measures. The corresponding expected utilities
U(L1) =
32
9
, U(L2) =
40
9
,
result in the utility factors
f (pi1) =
4
9
, f (pi2) =
5
9
,
which show that the second lottery is more useful.
The experimental probabilities are defined as the fractions of
subjects preferring the related lotteries. According to Tversky and
Thaler (1990), in the case of choice, it was found that 71% of
decision makers preferred the more certain lottery L1, so that
p(pi1) = 0.71 > p(pi2) = 0.29 ,
despite that this lottery is less useful. In view of (4), this
corresponds to the attraction factors
q(pi1) = 0.266 , q(pi2) = −0.266 .
However, when pricing, 67% of subjects found Lottery L2 more
valuable, so that
p(pi3) = 0.33 < p(pi4) = 0.67 ,
despite that the win in this lottery is less probable. The related
attraction factors are
q(pi3) = −0.114 , q(pi4) = 0.114 .
Notice that, in the case of pricing, the attraction factor signs
are reversed as compared to the case of choosing. This is in
agreement with the probability-amount dichotomy (Kim et al.,
2012): when choosing, one accepts as more attractive the lottery
with a higher probability win, while when pricing, one treats as
more attractive the lottery with a higher payoff amount. In the
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process of pricing, decision makers usually are more pragmatic,
evaluating higher the more useful lottery.
Combining the data of this experiment, the two inequalities
(20) read
−0.228 < 0.111 < 0.452 ,
which confirms the prediction of QDT.
Example 2. When there is no preference reversal, the criterion
(20) does not hold. To illustrate this, let us consider an example
treated by Tversky et al. (1990), taking the lotteries
L1 = {100, 0.97 | 0, 0.03} , L2 = {400, 0.31 | 0, 0.69} .
Their expected utilities are
U(L1) = 97 , U(L2) = 124 ,
which yields the utility factors
f (pi1) = 0.439 , f (pi2) = 0.561 .
The first lottery is essentially more certain, and subjects
overwhelmingly tend to prefer this lottery, so that
p(pi1) = 0.91 > p(pi2) = 0.09 .
According to (4), the related attractions factors are
q(pi1) = 0.471 , q(pi2) = −0.471 .
When pricing, subjects pay higher attention to the payoff
amounts so that the fraction of decision makers preferring
the first lottery is drastically reduced. However, the preference
reversal does not occur per se, with the (more narrow) majority
pricing the first lottery higher:
p(pi3) = 0.54 > p(pi4) = 0.46 .
The corresponding attraction factors are
q(pi3) = 0.101 , q(pi4) = −0.101 .
Since
f (pi2)− f (pi1) = 0.122 < 2q(pi3) = 0.202 ,
criterion (20) is not fulfilled, which is the expected situation in
absence of preference reversal.
This example demonstrates that, although in pricing, one
pays a higher attention to payoff amounts, however, the focus is
not exclusively on this amount. Probabilities can also influence
decisions, together with amounts.
Example 3. Another example from Tversky et al. (1990) deals
with the lotteries
L1 = {12, 0.92 | 0, 0.08} , L2 = {175, 0.06 | 0, 0.94} .
The first lottery is both more certain as well as more useful, with
the expected utilities
U(L1) = 11.04 , U(L2) = 10.5
and the utility factors
f (pi1) = 0.513 , f (pi2) = 0.487 .
It is not surprising that, when choosing, decision makers prefer
this lottery according to
p(pi1) = 0.81 > p(pi2) = 0.19 .
The related attraction factors are
q(pi1) = 0.297 , q(pi2) = −0.297 .
When pricing, subjects take into account that the second
lottery can provide a much higher payoff, yet with too small a
probability. As a result, the fraction of decision makers preferring
the first lottery diminishes, but preference reversal does not
happen:
p(pi3) = 0.58 > p(pi4) = 0.42 .
In pricing, the first lottery becomes less attractive than in
choosing, but remains more attractive than the second lottery,
with the attraction factors
q(pi3) = 0.067 , q(pi4) = −0.067 .
In view of the relations
f (pi2)− f (pi1) = −0.026 < 2q(pi3) = 0.134 ,
criterion (20) does not hold, in agreement with the absence of
preference reversal. Again, we see that payoff amounts as well as
probabilities are considered in the process of pricing, although
the role of payoff amounts, without doubt, is more important in
pricing than in choosing.
We have also analyzed a large set of data presented by Tversky
et al. (1990), demonstrating the effect of preference reversal.
Pairs of lotteries were presented to 198 participants. In each pair,
one of the lotteries, L1, had a high probability, while the other,
L2, a higher payoff with lower probability. These lotteries are
given in Table 1. In each lottery, the first number is a payoff
and the next number is the probability of this payoff. A lottery
is represented as a set {x, p(x)}, implying that one gets either
the payoff x, with probability p(x), or nothing, with probability
1− p(x). The expected utilities and utility factors are shown. The
first six lottery pairs include rather small payoffs. The following
five pairs contain much larger payoffs by a factor of 25. And the
last five pairs present a mixture of large and small payoffs. All the
cases demonstrate the effect of preference reversal.
In Table 2, we show the prospect probabilities p(pi1) and
p(pi3), with the corresponding attraction factors q(pi1) and q(pi3),
demonstrating preference reversal, since p(pi1) > p(pi2), although
p(pi3) < p(pi4). Those quantities that are not presented can be
found from the relations
f (pi1) = f (pi3) , f (pi2) = f (pi4) ,
p(pi2) = 1− p(pi1) , p(pi4) = 1− p(pi3) ,
q(pi2) = −q(pi1) , q(pi4) = −q(pi3) .
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TABLE 1 | Pairs of lotteries, with their expected utilities and utility factors.
L1 L2 U(L1) U(L2) f(pi1) f(pi2)
4, 0.97 16, 0.31 3.88 4.96 0.439 0.561
2, 0.81 9, 0.19 1.62 1.71 0.486 0.514
3, 0.94 6.5, 0.50 2.82 3.25 0.465 0.535
4, 0.89 40, 0.11 3.56 4.4 0.447 0.553
2.5, 0.94 8.5, 0.39 2.35 3.315 0.415 0.585
2, 0.92 5, 0.50 1.84 2.5 0.424 0.576
50, 0.81 225, 0.19 40.5 42.75 0.486 0.514
75, 0.94 160, 0.50 70.5 80 0.468 0.532
100, 0.89 1000, 0.11 89 110 0.447 0.553
65, 0.94 210, 0.39 61.1 81.9 0.427 0.573
50, 0.92 125, 0.50 46 62.5 0.424 0.576
10, 0.78 100, 0.08 7.8 8 0.494 0.506
7, 0.69 40, 0.17 4.83 6.8 0.415 0.585
3, 0.86 13, 0.19 2.58 2.47 0.511 0.489
4, 0.94 150, 0.03 3.76 4.5 0.455 0.545
11, 0.89 135, 0.08 9.79 10.8 0.475 0.525
TABLE 2 | Probability p(pi1) defined as the fraction of decision makers
choosing the lottery L1, and probability p(pi3) defined as the fraction of
subjects pricing the lottery L1 higher.
p(pi1) p(pi3) q(pi1) q(pi3) [f(pi2) − f(pi1)]/2
0.83 0.26 0.391 −0.179 0.061
0.68 0.22 0.194 −0.266 0.014
0.71 0.30 0.245 −0.165 0.035
0.71 0.33 0.263 −0.117 0.053
0.73 0.17 0.315 −0.245 0.085
0.62 0.14 0.196 −0.284 0.076
0.86 0.48 0.374 −0.006 0.014
0.77 0.46 0.302 −0.008 0.032
0.84 0.47 0.393 0.023 0.053
0.82 0.48 0.393 0.053 0.073
0.70 0.32 0.276 −0.104 0.076
0.81 0.38 0.316 −0.114 0.006
0.68 0.21 0.265 −0.205 0.085
0.74 0.39 0.229 −0.121 −0.011
0.74 0.38 0.285 −0.075 0.045
0.79 0.46 0.315 −0.015 0.025
The corresponding attraction factors q(pi1 ) and q(pi3 ), and the combination [f (pi2 )− f (pi1 )]/2
that should be compared with those attraction factors according to criterion (20) obtained
from QDT, which reads here q(pi3 ) < [f (pi2 )− f (pi1 )]/2 < q(pi1 ).
We also show the value [f (pi2)−f (pi1)]/2 that has to be compared
with q(pi3) and q(pi1) in order to check the validity of criterion
(20). As is seen from Table 2, the preference reversal criterion
(20) is always valid.
Since, in each pair of lotteries considered in the case of
choosing or pricing, the utility factors do not change, the
preference reversal effect can be interpreted within QDT as
caused by the existence of the attraction factors. If one would
evaluate the lotteries solely on the basis of rational utility,
no preference reversal would occur. However, preferences of
decision makers involve irrational feelings and biases as well
as other considerations not included in the utility, which
are embodied in the attraction factors, accounting for the
phenomenon of preference reversal. In order to characterize the
deviation from rationality during decision making over a family
of N trials, we can introduce the irrationality measure
δj ≡
1
N
N∑
n=1
|q(pij)| .
Then δ1 measures the level of irrationality in the course of
choosing, while δ3 describes the degree of irrationality in the
process of pricing. From Table 2, we find δ1 = 0.299 and δ3 =
0.118. Thus, people seem to be significantly more irrational when
choosing, as compared to pricing. In other words, the evaluation
of lotteries in pricing is more rational.
5. Discussion
We have shown that the phenomenon of preference reversal,
which is treated as an anomaly in classical decision making, finds
a natural explanation in the frame of quantum decision theory.
In the latter, the preference probability consists of two terms,
the utility factor quantifying the utility of a prospect, and the
attraction factor characterizing behavioral biases of a decision
maker. In that way, a prospect probability, defined as a quantum
quantity, has the meaning of a behavioral probability taking
into account both utility of the considered prospects, as well as
their attractiveness for the decision maker, due to subconscious
behavioral biases. We have formulated the criterion associated
within QDT with preference reversal and we have illustrated its
validity for a large set of empirical data.
We summarize the key steps of the logic we have followed.
1. We acknowledge the existence of risk aversion that leads
human to prefer the more probable outcome ceteris paribus.
2. We formulate decisions in terms of QDT and derive the
general fundamental expression (4) of QDT: p = f + q.
3. We interpret q as an “attraction factor” embodying the point
resulting from risk aversion, which determines the sign of q.
4. The structure of QDT leads to criterion (20) for preference
reversal to occur, which relates the utilities of the two lotteries
to the attraction factors under choosing vs. pricing.
5. We showed that this criterion is verified by experiments.
We have thus demonstrated that QDT predicts the existence of
two inequalities for the reversal to occur, that turn out to be
confirmed.
It is worth noting that the effect of preference reversal does
not only occur when choice is compared with pricing, but similar
reversals can happen in other cases. As another illustration,
we can mention the so-called planning paradox that can be
represented by the following stylized example.
Suppose one is deliberating about stopping smoking. Let the
imaginary plan to stop smoking be denoted as the prospect pi1,
while continuing smoking corresponds to prospect pi2. The utility
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of not smoking clearly overweights that of smoking because
of evident health reasons. In contrast, the negative feelings,
connected with addiction, are yet too imaginary to influence the
mood of the decision maker. We thus expect that the related
attraction factors should be rather small, so that the decision is
based mainly on rational grounds. Hence, the preference in this
plan pi1 is expressed by the inequality p(pi1) > p(pi2), implying
that the majority of subjects would like to stop smoking.
However, when one has to choose to really stop smoking
now (but not in the future), then one actually meets another
alternative: really stop smoking, which can be denoted as the
prospect pi3, or continue smoking, the prospect pi4. Deciding
whether to really stop smoking now, one immediately confronts
negative feelings anticipating the suffering resulting from
addiction. This translates into the appearance of a negative
attraction factor q(pi3) devaluating the utility of not smoking. As
a result, p(pi3) becomes smaller than p(pi4), which means that the
majority of people do not really quit smoking.
This planning paradox gives a clear example of preference
reversal, which cannot be understood in terms of classical
utility considerations, since the utility of prospects does not
change. But there is no paradox in quantum decision theory,
where the effect of preference reversal is explained by the
variation of attraction factors. Numerous data, collected by
Walsh and Sanson-Fisher (2001) from the World Health
Organization, confirm the robust existence of the preference
reversal in the stop-smoking planning paradox. Thus the
preference reversal is a rather general phenomenon that obtains
a straightforward explanation in the framework of quantum
decision theory.
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